Court rulings & orders · On the timeline
16 Oct 2024
C/17/190788 · Interlocutory proceedings on jurisdiction
Ruling — Gates stays in the case
District Court (Leeuwarden)
Court decision · binding on the parties
In 30 seconds
The court rejects Gates's challenge and rules it has jurisdiction over him, because the claims against him are closely linked to those against Leeuwarden resident Hofstra. This is not a ruling on whether the claims are true.
Cheat sheet
- The court applies Dutch rules (Articles 1–14 Code of Civil Procedure), read in line with EU case law.
- It checks jurisdiction only 'prima facie' (on first view) and does not test the facts of the case.
- Hofstra, who lives in the district, is the 'anchor defendant'; the group-tort claim links Gates to him.
- Separate cases could produce clashing judgments on the same alleged facts, the court says.
- Gates must pay €1,406 in costs and file his defence by 27 November 2024.
- A hearing was held on 18 September 2024 before Judge T.P. Hoekstra.
Key passages · underlined
In view of the foregoing, this court has international jurisdiction under Article 7(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure to hear the claims against Gates.
There is a risk that separate proceedings concerning the claims against Hofstra et al. will lead to incompatible judgements regarding this set of facts, which is the same for all defendants and forms the basis for the alleged liability of Hofstra et al. on the grounds of joint and several tortious liability.
Legal certainty requires that the national court be able to rule easily on its own jurisdiction, without having to examine the merits of the case.
orders Gates to pay the costs of the proceedings amounting to €1,406.00, payable within fourteen days of being notified to do so
Read it · IoJ translationThe full document in English+
DISTRICT COURT OF THE NORTHERN NETHERLANDS
Civil Law
Court location [place of residence]
Case number: C/17/190788 / HA ZA 23-172
Judgment of 16 October 2024
in the case of
1. [claimant 1], residing in [place of residence],
2. [claimant 2], residing in [place of residence],
3. [claimant 3], residing in [place of residence],
4. [claimant 4], residing in [place of residence], hereinafter referred to as [claimant 4],
5. [claimant 5], residing in [place of residence],
6. [the late claimant 6], last residing in [place of residence],
7. [claimant 7], residing in [place of residence],
claimants in the main action, defendants in the interlocutory proceedings, lawyers: Mr A.G.W. van Kessel and Mr P.W.H. Stassen,
versus
1. [H], hereinafter referred to as: [H],
2. [I],
3. [J 1],
4. [K], hereinafter referred to as: [K],
5. [L],
6. [M], hereinafter referred to as: [M],
7. [N],
8. [O],
9. [P],
10. [Q],
14. [R],
all electing domicile in [place of residence],
17. THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS, having its seat in The Hague,
defendants in the main action, lawyers: Mr R.W. Veldhuis and Mr M.E.A. Möhring,
11. [T], residing in [place of residence],
defendant in the main action, lawyers: Mr D. Roessing and Mr Bredenoord-Spoek,
12. [U], residing in the municipality of [place of residence],
13. [V], residing in the municipality of [place of residence],
defendants in the main action, lawyers: Mr L. Broers and Mr R.H.W. Lamme,
16. [W], electing domicile in [place of residence],
defendant in the main action, lawyer: Mr A.H. Ekker,
15. [X], residing in [place of residence],
defendant in the main action, claimant in the interlocutory proceedings, hereinafter referred to as: [X], lawyer: Mr W. Heemskerk.
The claimants in the main action will hereinafter be referred to jointly as [claimant 1] et al., and the defendants in the main action will hereinafter be referred to jointly as [H] et al. or the defendants.
1. The proceedings
1.1. The course of the proceedings is evident from:
the interlocutory judgment of 1 May 2024
the letter of 14 May 2024 containing requests on behalf of [claimant 1] et al.
the court's letter of 12 June 2024, in which the court responded to those requests
the interlocutory rectification judgment of 12 June 2024
the e-mail containing requests on behalf of [claimant 1] et al. of 2 September 2024
the court's letter of 10 September 2024, in which the court responded to those requests
the e-mail containing a request on behalf of [claimant 1] et al. of 11 September 2024
the court's letter of 12 September 2024, in which the court responded to that request
the oral hearing of 18 September 2024, of which the court clerk made notes of the hearing
the oral pleading notes on behalf of [X]
the speaking notes on behalf of [claimant 1] et al.
the statement of [claimant 4], read out at the hearing by her father.
1.2. Finally, a date was set for judgment.
2. The facts
2.1. [X] is a wealthy American who has placed part of his wealth in a foundation under American law, named the [stichting]. [X] is a co-director of this foundation. The foundation's objective is to combat poverty, disease and inequality worldwide.
2.2. The [stichting] is associated with 'Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance' (hereinafter: Gavi), an international partnership in the field of vaccinations between various public and private entities.
2.3. The [stichting] is also associated with the World Economic Forum (hereinafter: WEF), an international organisation whose statutory objective is uniting 'leaders from business, governments, academia and society at large into a global community committed to improving the state of the world.' Professor [Y] (hereinafter: [Y]) is the founder and executive chairman of the WEF.
2.4. By letter of 28 February 2020, the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (hereinafter: RIVM) informed the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, insofar as relevant, as follows:
On 24 January last, an OMT [Outbreak Management Team; added by the court] was convened concerning the outbreak of a new coronavirus - at that time still called 2019-nCoV - in Wuhan in China. The virus has since been named SARS-CoV-2; the disease is called COVID-19. On 30 January 2020 the WHO declared the COVID-19 outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern.
2.5. Subsequently, in the course of 2020 and 2021, the Dutch government implemented various measures in the Netherlands which, according to the government, were intended to combat the coronavirus, including a face-mask obligation and a vaccination programme against Covid-19.
2.6. On 30 April 2020 a video message by [X] was published on YouTube with the title 'The race for a Covid-19 vaccine, explained'.
2.7. On 13 July 2020 a book was published, entitled 'Covid-19: The Great Reset', which [Y] wrote together with Mr [Y].
2.8. By letter of 21 October 2020, [K] was invited to the annual meeting of the WEF in May 2021. The invitation states, insofar as relevant, the following:
This Annual Meeting will be the first opportunity for leaders from government and business to come together again and design a common recovery path and rebuild a more resilient, cohesive and sustainable society. Underpinning it will be the process of the Great Reset, an unprecedented mobilization of actionable ideas from the Forum’s action groups, platforms and other initiatives to shape the post-COVID-19 world
2.9. On 3 December 2020 [X] was interviewed on NBC News's Today programme, the footage of which was subsequently posted on YouTube with the title 'It Looks Like Almost All The Vaccines Are Going To Succeed'.
2.10. In June 2021, as a prospective committee member of the OMT, [H] completed a so-called Declaration of Interests. In it he stated, among other things, that he was at that time working as a public health physician in infectious disease control and as a public health physician in forensic medicine at GGD Fryslân [the Friesland Municipal Health Service], and as chairman of the Netherlands Association for Infectious Disease Control (NVIB). In addition, according to him, he worked on an occasional basis as an adviser at 'Het Netwerkcentrum', his work consisting of writing scenarios for exercises in the field of infectious diseases and supervising those exercises from a so-called response cell.
3. The dispute in the main action
3.1. In the main action, [claimant 1] et al. claim that the court, by judgment:
(1) declare that [H] et al., as a group and each individually, acted unlawfully towards [claimant 1] et al. by intentionally and unlawfully misleading them and thereby inducing them to have Covid-19 injections administered which [H] et al. knew, or at least ought to have known, were not safe and effective;
(2) order [H] et al., jointly and severally, such that payment by one releases the others, by judgment provisionally enforceable, to compensate [claimant 1] et al. for their damage, to be assessed in follow-up proceedings for the assessment of damages and settled in accordance with the law;
(3) order [H] et al. to pay the costs of these proceedings pursuant to an order for costs to be made by the court, provisionally enforceable.
3.2. [claimant 1] et al. have based that claim, briefly and factually summarised, on the following. [H] et al. have implemented the Covid 19: The Great Reset Project. This is a project aimed at the total restructuring of societies in all countries that are members of the United Nations (hereinafter: UN), as described by [Y] in his book Covid-19: The Great Reset. In that restructuring, all factors determining a human life are made the object of forced change by the WEF and the UN. Characteristic of this political ideology is that this forced and planned change is presented as justified by pretending that the world is weighed down by major crises that can only be solved by centralised, hard global intervention. One of those pretended major crises is the Covid-19 pandemic. [H] et al. have acted unlawfully towards [claimant 1] et al., individually and as a group, by misleading them, in the context of implementing the Covid 19: The Great Reset Project, into having Covid-19 injections administered which [H] et al. knew, or at least ought to have known, were not safe and effective. These Covid-19 injections were never intended to protect [claimant 1] et al. against an alleged virus. As a result of these injections, [claimant 1] et al. have suffered mental and physical injury, according to [claimant 1] et al.
4. The dispute in the interlocutory proceedings
4.1. [X] claims that the court, by judgment, provisionally enforceable insofar as possible:
i. declare that it lacks jurisdiction, with respect to [X], to hear the claims of [claimant 1] et al.;
ii. order [claimant 1] et al. to pay the costs of these interlocutory proceedings, with the provision that statutory interest will be due on that order for costs from the fifteenth day after the date of the judgment to be given herein;
iii. order [claimant 1] et al. to pay the post-judgment costs, assessed in accordance with the liquidation tariff at € 173.00 or, in the event of service, € 271.00.
4.2. [X] has based the claim, briefly and factually summarised, on the following. According to the main rule of the common (non-treaty) law of international jurisdiction, the court of the defendant's domicile has jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Because [X] does not reside in the Netherlands, the court cannot derive jurisdiction from this main rule. Furthermore, it has been neither asserted nor shown to be plausible that the requirements for jurisdiction of the court have been met on the grounds of jurisdiction in Article 6, opening words and under (e), of the Code of Civil Procedure (DCCP), Article 7(1) DCCP and Article 9, opening words and under (c), DCCP, on which [claimant 1] et al. have relied.
4.3. [claimant 1] et al. contest the interlocutory claim and move that this claim be dismissed, with an order, to be declared provisionally enforceable, that [X] pay the costs of these proceedings, including the post-judgment costs.
4.4. The parties' contentions will be discussed in more detail below, insofar as necessary.
5. The assessment in the interlocutory proceedings
Subject of the dispute and the overall assessment framework
5.1. The dispute in these interlocutory proceedings revolves around the question whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the claims brought by [claimant 1] et al. against [X] in the main proceedings. [X] resides in the United States. No treaty containing rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters such as those at issue here applies between the Netherlands and the United States. The question whether the Dutch court has jurisdiction with respect to [X] must therefore be answered on the basis of the common law of international jurisdiction, as laid down, among other places, in Articles 1-14 DCCP.
5.2. When introducing and later amending Articles 1-14 DCCP, the Dutch legislature sought to align with, among other things, the predecessors of the current Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (hereinafter: Brussels I-bis Regulation). In interpreting the common rules on international jurisdiction, alignment should therefore in principle be sought with the case law of the CJEU on (the predecessors of) the Brussels I-bis Regulation. This is different if it is plausible that the Dutch legislature intended, in framing a common rule, to depart from the EU-law instruments or their interpretation by the CJEU.
5.3. It follows from the case law of the CJEU that a court which, in applying (the predecessors of) the Brussels I-bis Regulation, examines whether it has jurisdiction must not confine itself in this examination to the claimant's contentions, but must also take account of all the information available to it concerning the legal relationship actually existing between the parties and, where appropriate, the defendant's contentions. The examination of jurisdiction under the EU-law instruments may therefore not take place solely on the basis of the legal basis of the claim chosen by the claimant. Legal certainty requires that the national court be able readily to rule on its own jurisdiction without having to examine the case on the merits. If the defendant disputes the claimant's contentions, the court, in determining its jurisdiction, need not allow evidence to be produced regarding the facts relevant both to jurisdiction and to the merits, since that would anticipate the examination of the merits of the claims. It follows that, in answering this question, the court confines itself to a judgment at first sight (prima facie judgment). On the basis of what was considered above in legal ground 5.2, this standard also applies when the Dutch court, in applying the common rules on international jurisdiction, examines whether it has jurisdiction. After all, it is not plausible that the Dutch legislature intended to depart on this point from the EU-law instruments or their interpretation by the CJEU.
Does the court have jurisdiction under Article 7(1) DCCP?
5.4. In addition to the main rule that the defendant is summoned before the courts of the country where the defendant is domiciled, the DCCP provides several other rules of jurisdiction which lead to additional grounds of jurisdiction. The principle of legal certainty requires, among other things, that these rules of jurisdiction, which depart from the main rule, be interpreted in such a way that a reasonably well-informed defendant can reasonably foresee, on the basis of them, before which court other than that of the state of his domicile he might be summoned.
5.5. [claimant 1] et al. have relied on several of those additional grounds of jurisdiction, including the ground of jurisdiction laid down in Article 7(1) DCCP. [X] has contested those grounds of jurisdiction with reasons.
5.6. Article 7(1) DCCP provides that if the Dutch court has jurisdiction with respect to one of the defendants, it also has jurisdiction with respect to other defendants involved in the same proceedings, provided that there is such a connection between the claims against the various defendants that reasons of efficiency justify hearing them together.
5.7. In the judgment cited in footnote 2, the Supreme Court held that the first condition for applying Article 7(1) DCCP is that the Dutch court must have jurisdiction with respect to one of the other defendants (the so-called anchor defendant) on a ground other than that stated in Article 7(1) DCCP itself. If that condition is met, the second condition for applying Article 7(1) DCCP is that the claims against the other defendant(s) are sufficiently connected with the claims against the anchor defendant.
5.8. In interpreting Article 7(1) DCCP, it is relevant that this provision is based on (the predecessor of) Article 8, opening words and under 1, of the Brussels I-bis Regulation. In answering the question whether the claims are connected within the meaning of Article 7(1) DCCP, the case law of the CJEU may be taken as a guideline. According to the case law of the CJEU, claims are connected when (i) the claims are based on the same set of facts, and (ii) the claims are so closely connected legally that the claimant cannot reasonably be required to have the cases heard by different courts. If both conditions are met, it may be assumed that hearing the claims together is justified for reasons of efficiency and that the foreseeability requirement has been met. For the application of Article 8(1) of the Brussels I-bis Regulation, the CJEU sets the condition that there be a risk of divergence in the outcome of the dispute arising in the context of 'the same situation of fact and law'. In assessing whether this is the case, account must be taken of all the necessary elements of the file. In this connection the CJEU has formulated several factors which the court must include in its assessment. As to the question whether there is the same situation of fact, it is relevant whether the defendants coordinated their conduct with one another. As to the question whether there is the same situation in legal terms, the legal bases of the claims brought are a relevant factor.
5.9. On the basis of Article 2 DCCP and Article 99 DCCP, this court has both international and relative (territorial) jurisdiction to hear the claims against [H], because he resides in the district of this court. [H] can therefore be regarded as an anchor defendant within the meaning of Article 7(1) DCCP.
5.10. [claimant 1] et al. have based their claims against [H] et al. on, among other things, the contention that [H] et al. acted unlawfully towards them as a group. As the court understands it, [claimant 1] et al. contend to that end that [H] et al., and therefore [X] as well, form part of a worldwide group of persons, legal entities and other entities which, in the context of implementing a project called Covid 19: The Great Reset, misled people into having Covid-19 injections administered, while they knew, or at least ought to have known, that these injections were not safe and effective. From [X]'s oral pleading notes, the court infers that [X] has also understood the position of [claimant 1] et al. in this way. The court understands that [claimant 1] et al. further argue in this context that [X] committed this deception internationally through two videos published on YouTube in April and December 2020, in which [X] allegedly gave a false account of the necessity of the Covid-19 injections and of the safety of those injections, respectively. Insofar as [claimant 1] et al. intended to contend that, in addition, any conduct of the [stichting] must also be regarded as unlawful acts of [X] within this group, the court disregards that in the context of these interlocutory proceedings, since they have not substantiated it. According to [claimant 1] et al., some other defendants who participate in the alleged group, including [M] and [K], committed the deception in the Netherlands and misled them in doing so, among other things by holding press conferences. Because it was foreseeable for [X] that the group conduct created the danger of damage arising such as that suffered by [claimant 1] et al., he is, so [claimant 1] et al. contend, liable for that damage under Article 6:166 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC).
5.11. The court considers that it follows from this that the legal basis of the claims against [H] et al. is the same. It may be conceded to [X] that the specific unlawful acts with which he is charged differ from the specific unlawful acts with which [H] (and the other defendants) are charged. That, however, does not alter the fact that [claimant 1] et al. contend of all those acts that they were committed from within a group and that they qualify as an unlawful act committed in a group. When assessing this basis of the claims, the court in the main action will first have to assess whether, as [claimant 1] et al. contend and [X] disputes, there exists a worldwide group of persons, legal entities and other entities which, in the context of implementing a project called Covid 19: The Great Reset, misled people into having Covid-19 injections administered which they knew, or at least ought to have known, were not safe and effective. There is a risk that separate adjudication of the claims against [H] et al. will lead to irreconcilable judgments on this set of facts, which is the same for all defendants and forms the basis for the alleged liability of [H] et al. on the ground of an unlawful act committed in a group. In view of the assessment framework set out above, the required connection within the meaning of Article 7(1) DCCP between the claims against [X] and the claims against the anchor defendant [H] is thereby established.
5.12. In the context of these interlocutory proceedings, [X] has disputed the contentions of [claimant 1] et al. in general terms and argued that a sound and logical substantiation of the contentions of [claimant 1] et al. is lacking. This general denial has not been further substantiated and is insufficient to conclude on that basis that the contentions of [claimant 1] et al. are so unfounded that they cannot withstand the (limited) test referred to above in legal ground 5.3 in the context of these interlocutory proceedings on jurisdiction.
5.13. On the basis of the foregoing, this court has international jurisdiction under Article 7(1) DCCP to hear the claims against [X]. This means that the reliance of [claimant 1] et al. on Article 6, opening words and under (e), DCCP and Article 9, opening words and under (c), DCCP, and the contentions put forward by the parties on that subject, no longer need to be addressed.
Does the court have relative jurisdiction to hear the claim against [X]?
5.14. Insofar as [X], in the context of these interlocutory proceedings, has also disputed the relative jurisdiction of this court, the court considers that it has relative jurisdiction under Article 107 DCCP in conjunction with Article 99 DCCP. Article 107 DCCP provides that if a court has jurisdiction with respect to one of the defendants jointly involved in the proceedings, that court also has jurisdiction with respect to the other defendants, provided that there is such a connection between the claims against the various defendants that reasons of efficiency justify hearing them together. As considered above, the court has relative jurisdiction to hear the claims against [H]. The connection established above in the context of Article 7(1) DCCP also applies to relative jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 107 DCCP.
Conclusion and costs of the proceedings
5.15. In view of what has been considered above, [X]'s claim will be dismissed. [X], as the unsuccessful party, will be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings (including post-judgment costs). The costs of the proceedings of [claimant 1] et al. are assessed at:
lawyer's fees: € 1,228.00 (2 points × € 614.00)
post-judgment costs: € 178.00 (plus the increase as stated in the decision)
Total: € 1,406.00
6. The assessment in the main action
6.1. The court will refer the case to the cause list for the filing of a statement of defence by [X].
7. The decision
The court
in the interlocutory proceedings
7.1. dismisses the claim of [X],
7.2. orders [X] to pay the costs of the proceedings of € 1,406.00, to be paid within fourteen days of being requested to do so, to be increased by € 92.00 plus the costs of service if [X] does not comply with the order for costs in time and the judgment is subsequently served,
7.3. declares this judgment provisionally enforceable as regards the order for costs,
in the main action
7.4. orders that the case will again be placed on the cause list of 27 November 2024 for a statement of defence on the part of [X].
This judgment was given by Mr T.P. Hoekstra and pronounced in public on 16 October 2024.
Footnotes
[fn 1] See CJEU 16 June 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:449 (Universal Music/Schilling), legal grounds 42-46 and CJEU 5 July 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2319 (flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines), legal ground 54.
[fn 2] See Supreme Court 29 March 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:443.
[fn 3] Cf. opinion of Advocate General Vlas before Supreme Court 24 June 2022, ECLI:NL:PHR:2021:1145, point 2.39, and Amsterdam Court of Appeal 13 August 2024; ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2024:2238.
[fn 4] Cf. opinion of Advocate General Trstenjak before CJEU 1 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:798 (Eva Maria Painer), point 86 et seq.
[fn 5] See, among others, CJEU 13 July 2006, C-539/03, ECLI:EU:C:2006:458 (Roche/Primus).
[fn 6] See CJEU 1 December 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:798 (Eva Maria Painer).
Interest of Justice translation from the Dutch original. Only the Dutch text is authoritative. IoJ translation, not official; the Dutch original prevails.
Every defendant denies the claims, and the court has not ruled on them. Allegations are the claimants' pleaded positions, quoted as theirs. This is analysis and commentary, not legal advice. Interest of Justice is not a party to the case.